

# Public Document Pack



CYNGOR SIR  
YNYS MÔN  
ISLE OF ANGLESEY  
COUNTY COUNCIL

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<b>RHYBUDD O GYFARFOD</b>	<b>NOTICE OF MEETING</b>
<b>PWYLLGOR ARCHWILIO A LLWYODRAETHU (ARBENNIG)</b>	<b>AUDIT AND GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE (EXTRAORDINARY)</b>
<b>DYDD IAU, 18 CHWEFROR, 2016 am 2:00 y prynhawn</b>	<b>THURSDAY, 18 FEBRUARY 2016 at 2.00 p.m.</b>
<b>YSTAFELL BWYLLGOR 1, SWYDDFEYDD Y CYNGOR, LLANGFNI</b>	<b>COMMITTEE ROOM 1, COUNCIL OFFICES, LLANGFNI</b>
<b>Swyddog Pwyllgor</b>	<b>Ann Holmes 01248 752518 Committee Officer</b>

## **AELODAU / MEMBERS**

Cynghorwyr / Councillors:-

### **Annibynnol / Independent**

Jim Evans, Dafydd Rhys Thomas and Richard Owain Jones

### **Plaid Cymru / The Party of Wales**

John Griffith (Is-Gadeirydd/Vice-Chair), Alun W Mummery and Nicola Roberts

### **Grwp Chwyldroad/Revolutionist Group**

Peter Rogers

### **Heb Ymaelodi / Unaffiliated**

R LI Jones (Cadeirydd/Chair)

## **AELODAU LLEYG / LAY MEMBERS**

Mrs Sharon Warnes and Mr Richard Barker

## **A G E N D A**

**1     DECLARATION OF INTEREST**

To receive any declaration of interest by any member or officer in respect of any item of business.

**2     TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT 2016/17 (Pages 1 - 32)**

To present the Treasury Management Strategy Statement for 2016/17.

<b>ISLE OF ANGLESEY COUNTY COUNCIL</b>	
<b>REPORT TO:</b>	<b>AUDIT COMMITTEE</b>
<b>DATE:</b>	<b>18 FEBRUARY 2016</b>
<b>SUBJECT:</b>	<b>TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT 2016/17</b>
<b>LEAD OFFICER:</b>	<b>MARC JONES</b>
<b>CONTACT OFFICER:</b>	<b>CLAIRE KLIMASZEWSKI/GARETH ROBERTS (TEL:1865/2675)</b>
<b>Nature and reason for reporting</b>	
For scrutiny - consistent with professional guidance.	

1. This report is presented to ensure that the Council is implementing best practice in accordance with the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) Code of Practice for Treasury Management. The code recommends that prior to being presented for adoption, members should scrutinise the Treasury Management Strategy Statement (which includes the Annual Investment Strategy, the annual MRP Policy Statement, the annual Treasury Management Policy Statement and the Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation). This Authority's scheme of delegation charges the Audit Committee with this function.
2. The CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management (Section 7) recommends that the Authority's Treasury Management Practices (TMPs) should be approved, documented and monitored. It goes on to state that the nature and extent of the involvement of an organisation's responsible body in approving and monitoring its TMPs and accompanying schedules is a matter for local decision and recognises that in some organisations this may be delegated to the responsible officer. In all cases it should be subjected to scrutiny by the responsible body following recommendations by the responsible officer. This Authority does not currently have documented TMPs but it is intended that this will be resolved in 2016/17 and presented at the earliest opportunity to the relevant committees, in line with the proposed Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation for 2016/17.
3. In terms of updates to the Treasury Management Strategy Statement there is no proposed amendment to the core principals and policies of the 2015/16 Statement.
4. The Council's external borrowing stood at £110.7m as at 22 January 2016, this is expected to be the position at 31 March 2016. The borrowing is made up of fixed and variable rate. The fixed rate borrowing stood at £110.5m with an average life of 25 years, and average interest rate of 5.52%. The variable rate of borrowing stood at £0.2m with an average life of 10 years and an average interest rate of 9.41%. The anticipated cost of borrowing for 2015/16 is £5.6m and the forecast underlying need to borrow at the yearend is £130.2m. This means that the Council will be internally borrowed by £19.5m by the year end.

The Council's investments as at 22 January 2016 stood at £28.4m with an average rate of return of 0.37% and the average balance for the year to date is £27.9m. As internal borrowing has increased the investment balances have decreased.

5. Recommendations:
  - To note the contents of this covering report;
  - To endorse the Treasury Management Strategy Statement (including the Prudential and Treasury Management Indicators) [Annex A] for 2016/17; and
  - To pass any recommendations and/or comments to the Executive Committee.

**TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT****ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY, MINIMUM REVENUE PROVISION POLICY STATEMENT AND TREASURY MANAGEMENT POLICY STATEMENT 2016/17****1. Introduction****1.1 Background**

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, meaning that total income due during the financial year must be sufficient to meet expenditure, and also that actual cash inflows must be adequate to cover cash outflows. A key part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's policy to minimise risk ensuring adequate liquidity before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

A particular point is that a local authority must calculate its budget requirement for each financial year to include the revenue costs that flow from capital financing decisions. This means that:-

- increases in revenue costs resulting from increases in interest charges, incurred to finance additional borrowing to finance capital expenditure; and
- any increases in running costs from new capital projects, must be limited to a level which is affordable within the Council's projected income.

The Treasury Management Policy Statement defines the policies and objectives of the treasury management activities. See Appendix 10.

**1.2 Reporting Requirements**

The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals. These reports are required to be adequately scrutinised by committee before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Audit Committee.

**Prudential and Treasury Management Indicators and Treasury Strategy** - The first and most important report, covers:-

- the Treasury Management Strategy (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised) including treasury management indicators;
- an Investment Strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed);
- a Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Policy (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- a Treasury Management Policy Statement (definition of the policies and objectives of the treasury management function); and
- the capital plans (including the associated prudential indicators).

**A Mid-Year Treasury Management Report** - This will update members with the progress of the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether the treasury strategy is meeting its objectives or whether any policies require revision.

**An Annual Treasury Report** - This provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury management indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

### **1.3 Treasury Management Strategy for 2016/17**

The strategy for 2016/17 covers two main areas:-

#### **Capital Issues**

- The capital plans and the prudential indicators; and
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) strategy.

#### **Treasury management Issues**

- The current treasury position;
- treasury management indicators which will limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, the Welsh Government MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and the Welsh Government Investment Guidance.

### **1.4 Training**

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that Members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to Members responsible for scrutiny. In order to support the scrutiny role of the members of the Audit Committee, the committee's members received training in treasury management, delivered by the appointed treasury management consultants during the summer of 2014. Further training will be arranged in the near future.

The training needs of treasury management officers are regularly reviewed and addressed.

### **1.5 Treasury management consultants**

The Council uses Capita Asset Services, – Treasury Solutions (herein referred to as Capita) as its external treasury management advisors. In accordance with procurement regulations the Treasury Management advisory service will be advertised for tender for the period 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2019 with an option to extend for 2 years.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

## 1.6 Adoption of the Code

The Council is required to indicate if it has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management. The current, 2011, code of practice has already been adopted by this Council therefore no update is required for 2016/17. In addition the authority follows guidance in the CIPFA Prudential Code 2013 which supplements the CIPFA code of practice on Treasury Management.

## 1.7 Housing Revenue Account (HRA) Buy-out

The Executive report of 26 February 2015 for the authority's Treasury Management Strategy 2015/16 highlighted the planned exit of the HRA in point 5. It also referred to appendix 11 and 12 for further information on this. On 2 April 2015/16 the HRA buy-out was completed and £21.2m was borrowed from the PWLB for this. The council proceeded with the buy-out as the council generate more income from the freedom this allows and will no longer be required to pay the annual HRA subsidy to Welsh Government. The Council has adopted a one-pool approach for loans which means that the costs of borrowing are averaged between the general fund and HRA in proportion to their respective debts.

## 2. Capital Considerations

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

The Authority's capital expenditure projections for 2016/17 to 2018/19 are reflected in the Prudential Indicators (Appendix 11). The projected expenditure for 2016/17 to 2018/19 is based on the capital bids recommended for approval by The Council at its meeting 10<sup>th</sup> March 2016 in accordance with the 2015/16 Capital Strategy. The projections for those years also includes the assumption that slippage from 2015/16 will be fully spent in 2016/17.

The overall programmes will be limited to what is affordable, both in terms of actual capital spend and in terms of the revenue implications (see 1.1 above). The prudential indicators are contained in Appendix 11.

The table below summarises the above capital expenditure plans and how these plans are being financed by capital or revenue resources. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need, which can be seen in table 3.1.

Capital expenditure £'000m	2014/15 Actual	2015/16 Estimate	2016/17 Estimate	2017/18 Estimate	2018/19 Estimate
Non-HRA	15,768	18,210	33,900	17,830	23,980
HRA	5,519	6,960	14,900	7,670	6,400
<b>Total</b>	<b>21,287</b>	<b>25,170</b>	<b>48,800</b>	<b>25,490</b>	<b>30,380</b>
<b>Financed by:</b>					
Capital receipts	2,427	2,830	2,120	500	0
Capital grants	11,332	13,390	21,120	14,690	23,730
Capital reserves	0	0	500	0	0
Revenue	2,863	4,310	12,290	5,030	3,750
<b>Net financing need for the year</b>	<b>4,665</b>	<b>4,640</b>	<b>12,770</b>	<b>5,270</b>	<b>2,900</b>

### 3. Borrowing

The capital expenditure plans, set out in a separate report to the Executive Committee, provide details of the service activity of the Council. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury/prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

#### 3.1 Current and Projected Borrowing Requirement and Actual Borrowing

The forecast movements in the Council's capital financing requirement (CFR) are:-

<b>ESTIMATED MOVEMENTS IN THE CAPITAL FINANCING REQUIREMENT AND REPLACEMENT BORROWING 2015/16 TO 2018/19</b>				
	<b>2015/16 Projected £'000</b>	<b>2016/17 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2017/18 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2018/19 Estimate £'000</b>
<b>Movement in the CFR</b>				
New borrowing to support capital expenditure				
<i>Supported Borrowing</i>	1,700	2,776	2,189	2,189
<i>Unsupported Borrowing</i>	24,100	11,035	3,785	2,360
<b>Total</b>	<b>25,800</b>	<b>13,811</b>	<b>5,974</b>	<b>4,549</b>
<i>Reduce by: Minimum Revenue Provision and set aside capital receipts</i>	(4,199)	(4,711)	(5,136)	(5,033)
<b>Net movement in the CFR</b>	<b>21,601</b>	<b>9,100</b>	<b>838</b>	<b>(484)</b>
<b>Potential movements in actual borrowing</b>				
Movement in the CFR (above)	-	<b>9,100</b>	<b>838</b>	<b>(484)</b>
Externalisation of pre 2016/17 internal borrowing	-	19,435	-	-
Replacement Borrowing	-	9	5,509	5,010
<b>Total potential new borrowing</b>	-	<b>28,544</b>	<b>6,347</b>	<b>4,526</b>

#### 3.2 Prospects for Interest Rates

The Council's appointed treasury advisor is Capita Asset Services and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Appendix 3 draws together a number of current City forecasts for short term (Bank Rate) and longer fixed interest rates. The following table gives the Capita central view.

<b>Annual Average (%)</b>	<b>Bank Rate (%)</b>	<b>PWLB Borrowing Rates (including certainty rate adjustment)</b>		
		<b>5 year</b>	<b>25 year</b>	<b>50 year</b>
March 2016	0.50	2.00	3.40	3.20
June 2016	0.50	2.10	3.40	3.20
September 2016	0.50	2.20	3.50	3.30
December 2016	0.75	2.30	3.60	3.40
March 2017	0.75	2.40	3.70	3.50
June 2017	1.00	2.50	3.70	3.60
September 2017	1.00	2.60	3.80	3.70
December 2017	1.25	2.70	3.90	3.80
March 2018	1.25	2.80	4.00	3.90
June 2018	1.50	2.90	4.00	3.90
September 2018	1.50	3.00	4.10	4.00
December 2018	1.75	3.10	4.10	4.00
March 2019	1.75	3.20	4.10	4.00

UK. UK GDP growth rates in 2013 of 2.2% and 2.9% in 2014 were the strongest growth rates of any G7 country; the 2014 growth rate was also the strongest UK rate since 2006 and although the 2015 growth rate is likely to be a leading rate in the G7 again, it looks likely to disappoint previous forecasts and come in at about 2%. Quarter 1 of 2015 was weak at +0.4% (+2.9% y/y) though there was a slight increase in quarter 2 to +0.5% (+2.3% y/y) before weakening again to +0.4% (2.1% y/y) in quarter 3. The November Bank of England Inflation Report included a forecast for growth to remain around 2.5 – 2.7% over the next three years, driven mainly by strong consumer demand as the squeeze on the disposable incomes of consumers has been reversed by a recovery in wage inflation at the same time that CPI inflation has fallen to, or near to, zero since February 2015. Investment expenditure is also expected to support growth. However, since the August Inflation report was issued, most worldwide economic statistics have been weak and financial markets have been particularly volatile. The November Inflation Report flagged up particular concerns for the potential impact of these factors on the UK.

The Inflation Report was also notably subdued in respect of the forecasts for inflation; this was expected to barely get back up to the 2% target within the 2-3 year time horizon. The increase in the forecast for inflation at the three year horizon was the biggest in a decade and at the two year horizon was the biggest since February 2013. However, the first round of falls in oil, gas and food prices over late 2014 and also in the first half 2015, will fall out of the 12 month calculation of CPI during late 2015 / early 2016 but a second, more recent round of falls in fuel and commodity prices will delay a significant tick up in inflation from around zero: this is now expected to get back to around 1% by the end of 2016 and not get to near 2% until the second half of 2017, though the forecasts in the Report itself were for an even slower rate of increase. However, more falls in the price of oil and imports from emerging countries in early 2016 will further delay the pick up in inflation. There is therefore considerable uncertainty around how quickly pay and CPI inflation will rise in the next few years and this makes it difficult to forecast when the MPC will decide to make a start on increasing Bank Rate.

The weakening of UK GDP growth during 2015 and the deterioration of prospects in the international scene, especially for emerging market countries, have consequently led to forecasts for when the first increase in Bank Rate would occur being pushed back to quarter 4 of 2016. There is downside risk to this forecast i.e. it could be pushed further back.

USA. The American economy made a strong comeback after a weak first quarter's growth at +0.6% (annualised), to grow by no less than 3.9% in quarter 2 of 2015, but then pulled back to 2.0% in quarter 3. The run of strong monthly increases in nonfarm payrolls figures for growth in employment in 2015 prepared the way for the Fed. to embark on its long awaited first increase in rates of 0.25% at its December meeting. However, the accompanying message with this first increase was that further increases will be at a much slower rate, and to a much lower ultimate ceiling, than in previous business cycles, mirroring comments by our own MPC.

EZ. In the Eurozone, the ECB fired its big bazooka in January 2015 in unleashing a massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy up high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries. This programme of €60bn of monthly purchases started in March 2015 and it was intended to run initially to September 2016. At the ECB's December meeting, this programme was extended to March 2017 but was not increased in terms of the amount of monthly purchases. The ECB also cut its deposit facility rate by 10bps from -0.2% to -0.3%. This programme of monetary easing has had a limited positive effect in helping a recovery in consumer and business confidence and a start to some improvement in economic growth. GDP growth rose to 0.5% in quarter 1 2015 (1.3% y/y) but has then eased back to +0.4% (+1.6% y/y) in quarter 2 and to +0.3% (+1.6%) in quarter 3. Financial markets were disappointed by the ECB's lack of more decisive action in December and it is likely that it will need to boost its QE programme if it is to succeed in significantly improving growth in the EZ and getting inflation up from the current level of around zero to its target of 2%.



Greece. During July, Greece finally capitulated to EU demands to implement a major programme of austerity and is now cooperating fully with EU demands. An €86bn third bailout package has since been agreed though it did nothing to address the unsupportable size of total debt compared to GDP. However, huge damage has been done to the Greek banking system and economy by the resistance of the Syriza Government, elected in January, to EU demands. The surprise general election in September gave the Syriza government a mandate to stay in power to implement austerity measures. However, there are major doubts as to whether the size of cuts and degree of reforms required can be fully implemented and so Greek exit from the euro may only have been delayed by this latest bailout.

Portugal and Spain. The general elections in September and December respectively have opened up new areas of political risk where the previous right wing reform-focused pro-austerity mainstream political parties have lost their majority of seats. An anti-austerity coalition has won a majority of seats in Portugal while the general election in Spain produced a complex result where no combination of two main parties is able to form a coalition with a majority of seats. It is currently unresolved as to what administrations will result from both these situations. This has created nervousness in bond and equity markets for these countries which has the potential to spill over and impact on the whole Eurozone project.

- Investment returns are likely to remain relatively low during 2016/17 and beyond;
- Borrowing interest rates have been highly volatile during 2015 as alternating bouts of good and bad news have promoted optimism, and then pessimism, in financial markets. Gilt yields have continued to remain at historically phenomenally low levels during 2015. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances, has served well over the last few years. However, this needs to be carefully reviewed to avoid incurring higher borrowing costs in later times, when authorities will not be able to avoid new borrowing to finance new capital expenditure and/or to refinance maturing debt;
- There will remain a cost of carry to any new borrowing which causes an increase in investments as this will incur a revenue loss between borrowing costs and investment returns.

### **3.3 Borrowing Strategy**

The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This approach is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is high, and will continue to be followed where appropriate (see 3.3.1 below for a more detailed consideration of internal and external borrowing). As part of this strategy the ability to externally borrow to repay the reserves and balances if needed is important. Table 3.1 indicates that £19.345m may need to be externally borrowed if urgently required. This is the amount of council reserves and balances used in the past to fund the capital programme instead of taking out borrowing.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2016/17 treasury operations. The S151 Officer will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:-

- if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp FALL in long and short term rates (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then long term borrowings will be postponed, and potential rescheduling from fixed rate funding into short term borrowing will be considered if it is cost effective to do so.

- if it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper RISE in long and short term rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the start date and in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised with the likely action that fixed rate funding will be drawn whilst interest rates are still lower than they will be in the next few years

### **3.3.1 External v. internal borrowing**

Current conditions indicate a need for a flexible approach to the choice between internal and external borrowing. Many of the factors which lay behind previous policies to externalise all borrowing remain valid, e.g.:-

- With a continuing historically abnormally low Bank Rate and PWLB rates, there remains a unique opportunity for local authorities to actively manage their strategy of undertaking new external borrowing.

However, it remains the case that there are certain limitations to this approach, as previously noted, e.g.:-

- The policy can cause exposure to credit risk (e.g. risk of the bank defaulting on the debt), so this aspect must be very carefully managed;
- Careful on going consideration needs to be given to the difference between borrowing rates and investment rates to ensure the Council obtains value for money once an appropriate level of risk management has been attained to ensure the security of its investments.

In favour of internalisation, over the medium term investment rates are expected to continue to be below long term borrowing rates. This means that value for money considerations would indicate that value could best be obtained by avoiding new external borrowing and by using internal cash balances to finance new capital expenditure, or to replace maturing external debt (this is referred to as internal borrowing). This would maximise short term savings.

However, short term savings by avoiding new long term external borrowing in 2015/16 must also be weighed against the potential for incurring additional long term extra costs, by delaying unavoidable new external borrowing until later years when PWLB long term rates are forecast to be higher. Additionally, the cash flow implications of internalising borrowing require regular review and will limit the potential extent of internalising borrowing.

Against this background, caution will be adopted with the 2016/17 treasury operations. The S151 Officer will monitor the interest rate market and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances, reporting any decisions to the appropriate decision making body at the earliest opportunity.

### **3.4 Policy on borrowing in advance of need**

The Council will not borrow more than, or in advance of, its needs, solely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

In determining whether borrowing will be undertaken in advance of need the Council will:-

- ensure that there is a clear link between the capital programme and maturity profile of the existing debt portfolio which supports the need to take funding in advance of need;
- ensure the ongoing revenue liabilities created, and the implications for the future plans and budgets, have been considered;
- evaluate the economic and market factors that might influence the manner and timing of any decision to borrow;
- consider the advantages and disadvantages of alternative forms of funding;
- consider the alternative interest rate bases available, the most appropriate periods to fund and repayment profiles to use; and
- consider the impact of borrowing in advance on temporarily (until required to finance capital expenditure) increasing investment cash balances and the consequent increase in exposure to counterparty risk, and other risks, and the level of such risks given the controls in place to minimise them.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

### **3.5 Debt Rescheduling**

As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (i.e. premiums incurred).

The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:-

- the generation of cash savings and/or discounted cash flow savings;
- helping to fulfil the treasury strategy;
- enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.

All rescheduling will be reported to the Audit Committee, at the earliest practicable meeting following its action. A recent review of this highlighted that it would cost the council more to reschedule debt than it would save in interest due to significant early repayment premiums imposed by the PWLB.

## **4. Annual Investment Strategy**

### **4.1 Changes to Credit Rating Methodology**

The main rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's) have, through much of the financial crisis, provided some institutions with a ratings "uplift" due to implied levels of sovereign support. Commencing in 2015, in response to the evolving regulatory regime, all three agencies have begun removing these "uplifts" with the timing of the process determined by regulatory progress at the national level. The process has been part of a wider reassessment of methodologies by each of the rating agencies. In addition to the removal of implied support, new methodologies are now taking into account additional factors, such as regulatory capital levels. In some cases, these factors have "netted" each other off, to leave underlying ratings either unchanged or little changed. A consequence of these new methodologies is that they have also lowered the importance of the (Fitch) Support and Viability ratings and have seen the (Moody's) Financial Strength rating withdrawn by the agency.

In keeping with the agencies' new methodologies, the rating element of our own credit assessment process now focuses solely on the Short and Long Term ratings of an institution. While this is the same process that has always been used for Standard & Poor's, this has been a change in the use of Fitch and Moody's ratings. It is important to stress that the other key elements to our process, namely the assessment of Rating Watch and Outlook information as well as the Credit Default Swap (CDS) overlay have not been changed.

The evolving regulatory environment, in tandem with the rating agencies' new methodologies also means that sovereign ratings are now of lesser importance in the assessment process. Where through the crisis, clients typically assigned the highest sovereign rating to their criteria, the new regulatory environment is attempting to break the link between sovereign support and domestic financial institutions. While this authority understands the changes that have taken place, it will continue to specify a minimum sovereign rating of F1 (Fitch), P-1 (Moody's), A-1 (Standard & Poor's), and a minimum Long Term sovereign rating of A (Fitch), A2 (Moody's) and A (Standards & Poor). This is in relation to the fact that the underlying domestic and where appropriate, international, economic and wider political and social background will still have an influence on the ratings of a financial institution.

It is important to stress that these rating agency changes do not reflect any changes in the underlying status or credit quality of the institution. They are merely reflective of a reassessment of rating agency methodologies in light of enacted and future expected changes to the regulatory environment in which financial institutions operate. While some banks have received lower credit ratings as a result of these changes, this does not mean that they are suddenly less credit worthy than they were formerly. Rather, in the majority of cases, this mainly reflects the fact that implied sovereign government support has effectively been withdrawn from banks. They are now expected to have sufficiently strong balance sheets to be able to withstand foreseeable adverse financial circumstances without government support. In fact, in many cases, the balance sheets of banks are now much more robust than they were before the 2008 financial crisis when they had higher ratings than now. However, this is not universally applicable, leaving some entities with modestly lower ratings than they had through much of the "support" phase of the financial crisis.

## **4.2 Investment Policy**

The Council's investment policy has regard to the Welsh Government's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance") and the 2011 revised CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice for Local Authorities and Cross-Sectorial Guidance Notes ("the CIPFA TM Code"). The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second, and then return.

In accordance with the above guidance from the Welsh Government and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Council applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.

As with previous practice, ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution and that it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To this end the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

Investment instruments identified for use in the financial year are listed in Appendix 5 under the 'specified' and 'non-specified' investments categories.

The Council will also from time to time, make loans, deposits and investments 'for the purpose of delivery of its Service's (policy investments). These transactions will require the authority of the County Council for amounts over £100k. All transactions will be subject to adequate credit quality and the approval of the Section 151 Officer in consultation with the Portfolio Holder for Finance.

### **4.3 Creditworthiness policy**

The primary principle governing the Council's investment criteria is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle, the Council will ensure that:-

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security. This is set out in the specified and non-specified investment sections below; and
- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

The S151 Officer will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the criteria set out in Appendix 6 and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary. These criteria are separate to that which determines which types of investment instrument are either specified or non-specified as it provides an overall pool of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

Credit rating information is supplied by Capita Asset Services, our treasury consultants, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list. Any rating changes, rating Watches (notification of a likely change), rating Outlooks (notification of a possible longer term change) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating Watch applying to a counterparty at the minimum Council criteria will be suspended from use, with all others being reviewed in light of market conditions.

All credit ratings will be monitored daily. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Capita creditworthiness service.

As an additional layer to the minimum credit rating criteria described above, this Council also employs the creditworthiness service provided by Capita Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:-

- Credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;

- Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
- Sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.

This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches and credit outlooks in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads from which the end product is a series of colour coded bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are used by the Council at the discretion of the S151 Officer, to assist in determining the duration for investments. The Council will, therefore, normally use counterparties within the following durational bands:-

- Yellow 5 years \*
- Dark pink 5 years for Enhanced money market funds (EMMFs) with a credit score of 1.25
- Light pink 5 years for Enhanced money market funds (EMMFs) with a credit score of 1.5
- Purple 2 years
- Blue 1 year (only applies to nationalised or semi nationalised UK Banks)
- Orange 1 year
- Red 6 months
- Green 100 days
- No colour not to be used

The Capita Asset Services creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings and, by using a risk weighted scoring system, does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.

Reference will also be made to other market data and market information, as available and as appropriate.

#### 4.4 Country limits

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA- from Fitch Ratings (or equivalent from other agencies if Fitch does not provide). The list of countries that qualify using this credit criteria as at the date of this report are shown in Appendix 7. This list will be added to or deducted from by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

#### 4.5 Investment Strategy

**In-house funds:** . Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

**Investment returns expectations:** Bank Rate is forecast to remain unchanged at 0.5% before starting to rise from quarter 4 of 2016. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:-

- 2016/17 0.75%
- 2017/18 1.25%
- 2018/19 1.75%

The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently to the downside (i.e. start of increases in Bank Rate occurs later). However, should the pace of growth quicken and / or forecasts for increases in inflation rise, there could be an upside risk.

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 100 days during each financial year for the next eight years are as follows:-

2016/17 0.60%  
2017/18 1.25%  
2018/19 1.75%  
2019/20 2.25%  
2020/21 2.50%  
2021/22 2.75%  
2022/23 2.75%  
2023/24 3.00%  
Later years 3.00%

For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its business reserve instant access and notice accounts and short-dated deposits (overnight to 100 days) in order to benefit from the compounding of interest

#### **4.6 End of year investment report**

At the end of the financial year, the Council will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

#### **4.7 External fund managers**

The Council has not appointed external fund managers. The need for this will be kept under review and a reported as appropriate before such an appointment is made.

#### **4.8 Policy on the use of external service providers**

In order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources, the Council uses Capita Assets Services as its external treasury management advisors. The terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

Final responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the Council.

#### **4.9 Delegation**

The Treasury Management scheme of delegation and the role of the Section 151 Officer are outlined in Appendix 8.

### **APPENDICES**

1. Loan maturity profile
2. MRP Policy Statement
3. Interest rate forecasts
4. Economic background
5. Specified and non-specified investments
6. Counterparty criteria
7. Approved countries for investments
8. Treasury management scheme of delegation and the role of the section 151 officer.
9. Treasury Management Key Principles
10. Treasury Management Policy Statement
11. Prudential and Treasury Indicators
12. Glossary of and information on Prudential & Treasury Management indicators

DADANSODDIAD BENTHYCIADAU YN AEDDFEDU 2015/16 YMLAEN/ LOANS MATURITY ANALYSIS 2015/16 ONWARDS						
	PWLB Aeddefedu/ PWLB Maturity £'000	PWLB EIP/ Annuity/ PWLB EIP/ Annuity £'000	Benthyciadau Marchnad/ Market Loans £'000	PWLB Amrywiol/ PWLB Variable £'000	Cyfanswm yn Aeddfedu/ Total Maturing £'000	%YN Aeddfedu o'r Cyfran yn sefyll/ Maturing of Total Outstanding %
2015/16	0	1	0	0	1	0.0
2016/17	0	9	0	0	9	0.0
2017/18	5,500	9	0	0	5,509	5.0
2018/19	5,000	10	0	0	5,010	4.5
2019/20	5,000	11	0	0	5,011	4.5
2020/21	4,500	12	0	0	4,512	4.1
2021/22	0	14	0	0	14	0.0
2022/23	2,285	15	0	0	2,300	1.7
2023/24	1,854	16	0	0	1,870	2.1
2024/25	0	18	0	0	18	0.0
2025/26	0	20	0	0	20	0.0
2026/27	1,381	22	0	0	1,403	1.3
2027/28	2,165	24	0	0	2,189	2.0
2028/29	262	26	0	0	288	0.3
2029/30	1,538	21	0	0	1,559	1.4
2030/31	451	15	0	0	466	0.4
2031/32	1,941	9	0	0	1,950	1.8
2032/33	315	8	0	0	323	0.3
2033/34	637	0	0	0	637	0.6
2034/35	624	0	0	0	624	0.6
2035/36	611	0	0	0	611	0.6
2036/37	599	0	0	0	599	0.5
2037/38	587	0	0	0	587	0.5
2038/39	225	0	0	0	225	0.2
2039/40	5,000	0	0	0	5,000	4.5
2040/41	3,500	0	0	0	3,500	3.2
2042/43	1,000	0	0	0	1,000	0.9
2043/44	1,020	0	0	0	1,020	0.9
2044/45	1,010	0	0	0	1,010	0.9
2045/46	11,464	0	0	0	11,464	10.3
2050/51	2,000	0	0	0	2,000	1.8
2052/53	28,238	0	0	0	28,238	25.4
2054/55	3,000	0	0	0	3,000	2.7
2055/56	3,500	0	0	0	3,500	3.2
2056/57	5,000	0	0	0	5,000	4.5
2057/58	8,513	0	0	0	8,513	7.7
2059/60	1,763	0	0	0	1,763	1.6
	<b>110,483</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>110,743</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Cyfartaledd bywyd (blynnyddoedd)/ Average life(years)	24.67	9.69	0.00	0.00	24.64	
Cyfartaledd graddfa (%)/ Average rate (%)	5.52	9.41	0.00	0.00	5.53	



## Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement 2016/17

The Council is required to pay off an element of the accumulated Council Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision (MRP)), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision (VRP)).

The Welsh Government regulations require the full Council to approve an MRP Statement in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided to councils, so long as there is a prudent provision. The Council is recommended to approve the following MRP Statement:-

For capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008 or for capital expenditure from 1 April 2008 financed supported capital expenditure for Revenue Support Grant purposes, the MRP policy will be to charge 4% of the CFR at the end of the preceding year (in accordance with option 2 of the statutory guidance).

From 1st April 2008 for all unsupported borrowing (including PFI and finance leases) the MRP policy will be the Asset Life method, with the MRP based on the estimated life of the assets, in accordance with the regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction) (in accordance with option 3 of the statutory guidance). The estimated life periods will be set by the S151 Officer based upon advice received from the relevant officers.

As some types of capital expenditure incurred by the Council are not capable of being related to an individual asset, asset lives will be assessed on a basis which most reasonably reflects the anticipated period of benefit that arises from the expenditure. Also, whatever type of expenditure is involved, it will be grouped together in a manner which reflects the nature of the main component of expenditure and will only be divided up in cases where there are two or more major components with substantially different useful economic lives.

The Housing Revenue Account share of the CFR is subject to a 2% MRP charge, based upon the closing CFR for the previous year, in line with the approved 30 year business plan.

Any repayments included in annual PFI or finance leases are applied as MRP.

## Rhagolygon Graddfeydd Llog 2016/2019 Interest Rate Forecasts 2016/2019

PWLB rates and forecast shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.

Capita Asset Services Interest Rate View													
	Mar-16	Jun-16	Sep-16	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19
<b>Bank Rate View</b>	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	1.75%
3 Month LIBID	0.50%	0.50%	0.60%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.10%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.60%	1.80%	1.90%
6 Month LIBID	0.70%	0.70%	0.80%	0.90%	1.00%	1.20%	1.30%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	2.00%	2.20%
12 Month LIBID	1.00%	1.00%	1.10%	1.20%	1.30%	1.50%	1.60%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.30%	2.40%
5yr PWLB Rate	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%
10yr PWLB Rate	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%
25yr PWLB Rate	3.40%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.10%	4.10%	4.10%
50yr PWLB Rate	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%
<b>Bank Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	0.50%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	1.75%
Capital Economics	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>5yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.50%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%
Capital Economics	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.50%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>10yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%
Capital Economics	3.35%	3.45%	3.45%	3.55%	3.65%	3.75%	3.85%	3.95%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>25yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	3.40%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.10%	4.10%	4.10%
Capital Economics	3.35%	3.45%	3.45%	3.55%	3.65%	3.75%	3.85%	3.95%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>50yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Capita Asset Services	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	3.90%	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%
Capital Economics	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	-	-	-	-	-

## Economic Background

### United Kingdom

UK GDP growth rates in of 2.2% in 2013 and 2.9% in 2014 were the strongest growth rates of any G7 country; the 2014 growth rate was also the strongest UK rate since 2006 and although the 2015 growth rate is likely to be a leading rate in the G7 again, it looks likely to disappoint previous forecasts and come in at about 2%. Quarter 1 2015 was weak at +0.4% (+2.9% y/y), although there was a slight increase in quarter 2 to +0.5% before weakening again to +0.4% (+2.1% y/y) in quarter 3. The Bank of England's November Inflation Report included a forecast for growth to remain around 2.5% – 2.7% over the next three years. For this recovery, however, to become more balanced and sustainable in the longer term, it still needs to move away from dependence on consumer expenditure and the housing market to manufacturing and investment expenditure. The strong growth since 2012 has resulted in unemployment falling quickly to a current level of 5.1%.

Since the August Inflation report was issued, most worldwide economic statistics have been weak and financial markets have been particularly volatile. The November Inflation Report flagged up particular concerns for the potential impact of these factors on the UK. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has set three criteria that need to be met before he would consider making a start on increasing Bank Rate. These criteria are patently not being met at the current time, (as he confirmed in a speech on 19 January):-

- Quarter-on-quarter GDP growth is above 0.6% i.e. using up spare capacity. This condition was met in Q2 2015, but Q3 came up short and Q4 looks likely to also fall short.
- Core inflation (stripping out most of the effect of decreases in oil prices), registers a concerted increase towards the MPC's 2% target. This measure was on a steadily decreasing trend since mid-2014 until November 2015 @ 1.2%. December 2015 saw a slight increase to 1.4%.
- Unit wage costs are on a significant increasing trend. This would imply that spare capacity for increases in employment and productivity gains are being exhausted, and that further economic growth will fuel inflationary pressures.

The MPC has been particularly concerned that the squeeze on the disposable incomes of consumers should be reversed by wage inflation rising back above the level of CPI inflation in order to underpin a sustainable recovery. It has, therefore, been encouraging in 2015 to see wage inflation rising significantly above CPI inflation which has been around zero since February. However, it is unlikely that the MPC would start raising rates until wage inflation was expected to consistently stay over 3%, as a labour productivity growth rate of around 2% would mean that net labour unit costs would still only be rising by about 1% y/y. The Inflation Report was notably subdued in respect of the forecasts for CPI inflation; this was expected to barely get back up to the 2% target within the 2-3 year time horizon. The increase in the forecast for inflation at the three year horizon was the biggest in a decade and at the two year horizon it was the biggest since February 2013. However, the first round of falls in oil, gas and food prices in late 2014 and in the first half 2015, will fall out of the 12 month calculation of CPI during late 2015 / early 2016 but only to be followed by a second, subsequent round of falls in fuel and commodity prices which will delay a significant tick up in inflation from around zero. CPI inflation is now expected to get back to around 1% in the second half of 2016 and not get near to 2% until the second half of 2017, though the forecasts in the Report itself were for an even slower rate of increase.

However, with the price of oil having fallen further in January 2016, and with sanctions having been lifted on Iran, enabling it to sell oil freely into international markets, there could well be some further falls still to come in 2016. The price of other commodities exported by emerging countries could also have downside risk and several have seen their currencies already fall by 20-30%, (or more), over the last year. These developments could well lead the Bank of England to lower the pace of increases in inflation in its February 2016 Inflation Report. On the other hand, the start of the national living wage in April 2016 (and further staged increases until 2020), will raise wage inflation; however, it could also result in a decrease in employment so the overall inflationary impact may be muted.

Confidence is another big issue to factor into forecasting. Recent volatility in financial markets could dampen investment decision making as corporates take a more cautious view of prospects in the coming years due to international risks. This could also impact in a slowdown in increases in employment. However, consumers will be enjoying the increase in disposable incomes as a result of falling prices of fuel, food and other imports from emerging countries, so this could well feed through into an increase in consumer expenditure and demand in the UK economy, (a silver lining!). Another silver lining is that the UK will not be affected as much as some other western countries by a slowdown in demand from emerging countries, as the EU and US are our major trading partners.

There is, therefore, considerable uncertainty around how quickly pay and CPI inflation will rise in the next few years and this makes it difficult to forecast when the MPC will decide to make a start on increasing Bank Rate. There are also concerns around the fact that the central banks of the UK and US currently have few monetary policy options left to them given that central rates are near to zero and huge QE is already in place. There are, accordingly, arguments that rates ought to rise sooner and quicker, so as to have some options available for use if there was another major financial crisis in the near future. But it is unlikely that either would aggressively raise rates until they are sure that growth was securely embedded and 'noflation' was not a significant threat.

The forecast for the first increase in Bank Rate has, therefore, been pushed back progressively over the last year from Q4 2015 to Q4 2016. Increases after that are also likely to be at a much slower pace, and to much lower final levels than prevailed before 2008, as increases in Bank Rate will have a much bigger effect on heavily indebted consumers and householders than they did before 2008. There has also been an increase in momentum towards holding a referendum on membership of the EU in 2016, rather than in 2017, with Q3 2016 being the current front runner in terms of timing; this could impact on MPC considerations to hold off from a first increase until the uncertainty caused by it has passed.

The Government's revised Budget in July eased the pace of cut backs from achieving a budget surplus in 2018/19 to achieving that in 2019/20 and this timetable was maintained in the November Budget.

### **United States of America**

GDP growth in 2014 of 2.4% was followed by Q1 2015 growth, which was depressed by exceptionally bad winter weather, at only +0.6% (annualised). However, growth rebounded remarkably strongly in Q2 to 3.9% (annualised) before falling back to +2.0% in Q3.

Until the turmoil in financial markets in August, caused by fears about the slowdown in Chinese growth, it had been strongly expected that the Fed. would start to increase rates in September. The Fed pulled back from that first increase due to global risks which might depress US growth and put downward pressure on inflation, as well as a 20% appreciation of the dollar which has caused the Fed. to lower its growth forecasts. Although the non-farm payrolls figures for growth in employment in August and September were disappointingly weak, the October figure was stunningly strong while November was also reasonably strong (and December was outstanding); this, therefore, opened up the way for the Fed. to embark on its first increase in rates of 0.25% at its December meeting. However, the accompanying message with this first increase was that further increases will be at a much slower rate, and to a much lower ultimate ceiling, than in previous business cycles, mirroring comments by our own MPC.

### **Eurozone**

In the Eurozone, the ECB fired its big bazooka in January 2015 in unleashing a massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy up high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries. This programme of €60bn of monthly purchases started in March 2015 and it is intended to run initially to September 2016. At the ECB's December meeting, this programme was extended to March 2017 but was not increased in terms of the amount of monthly purchases. The ECB also cut its deposit facility rate by 10bps from -0.2% to -0.3%. This programme of monetary easing has had a limited positive effect in helping a recovery in consumer and business confidence and a start to some improvement in economic growth. GDP growth rose to 0.5% in quarter 1 2015 (1.3% y/y) but has then eased back to +0.4% (+1.6% y/y) in quarter 2 and to +0.3% (+1.6%) in quarter 3. Financial markets were disappointed by the ECB's lack of more decisive

action in December and it is likely that it will need to boost its QE programme if it is to succeed in significantly improving growth in the EZ and getting inflation up from the current level of around zero to its target of 2%.

### **Greece**

During July, Greece finally capitulated to EU demands to implement a major programme of austerity. An €86bn third bailout package has since been agreed although it did nothing to address the unsupportable size of total debt compared to GDP. However, huge damage has been done to the Greek banking system and economy by the initial resistance of the Syriza Government, elected in January, to EU demands. The surprise general election in September gave the Syriza government a mandate to stay in power to implement austerity measures. However, there are major doubts as to whether the size of cuts and degree of reforms required can be fully implemented and so a Greek exit from the euro may only have been delayed by this latest bailout.

### **Portugal and Spain**

The general elections in September and December respectively have opened up new areas of political risk where the previous right wing reform-focused pro-austerity mainstream political parties have lost their majority of seats. A left wing / communist anti-austerity coalition has won a majority of seats in Portugal. The general election in Spain produced a complex result where no combination of two main parties is able to form a coalition with a majority of seats. It is currently unresolved as to what administrations will result from both these situations. This has created nervousness in bond and equity markets for these countries which has the potential to spill over and impact on the whole Eurozone project.

### **China and Japan**

Japan is causing considerable concern as the increase in sales tax in April 2014 suppressed consumer expenditure and growth. In Q2 2015 quarterly growth shrank by -0.2% after a short burst of strong growth of 1.1% during Q1, but then came back to +0.3% in Q3 after the first estimate had indicated that Japan had fallen back into recession; this would have been the fourth recession in five years. Japan has been hit hard by the downturn in China during 2015 and there are continuing concerns as to how effective efforts by the Abe government to stimulate growth, and increase the rate of inflation from near zero, are likely to prove when it has already fired the first two of its 'arrows' of reform but has dithered about firing the third, deregulation of protected and inefficient areas of the economy.

As for China, the Government has been very active during 2015 and the start of 2016, in implementing several stimulus measures to try to ensure the economy hits the growth target of about 7% for 2015. It has also sought to bring some stability after the major fall in the onshore Chinese stock market during the summer and then a second bout in January 2016. Many commentators are concerned that recent growth figures could have been massaged to hide a downturn to a lower growth figure. There are also major concerns as to the creditworthiness of much of bank lending to corporates and local government during the post 2008 credit expansion period. Overall, China is still expected to achieve a growth figure that the EU would be envious of. Nevertheless, there are growing concerns about whether the Chinese economy could be heading for a hard landing and weak progress in rebalancing the economy from an over dependency on manufacturing and investment to consumer demand led services. There are also concerns over the volatility of the Chinese stock market, which was the precursor to falls in world financial markets in August and September and again in January 2016, which could lead to a flight to quality to bond markets. In addition, the international value of the Chinese currency has been on a steady trend of weakening and this will put further downward pressure on the currencies of emerging countries dependent for earnings on exports of their commodities.

### **Emerging countries**

There are also considerable concerns about the vulnerability of some emerging countries, and their corporates, which are getting caught in a perfect storm. Having borrowed massively in dollar denominated debt since the financial crisis, (as investors searched for yield by channelling investment cash away from western economies with dismal growth, depressed bond yields and near zero interest rates into emerging countries), there is now a strong flow back to those western economies with strong growth and a path of rising interest rates and bond yields.

The currencies of emerging countries have therefore been depressed by both this change in investors' strategy, and the consequent massive reverse cash flow, and also by the expectations of a series of central interest rate increases in the US which has caused the dollar to appreciate significantly. In turn, this has made it much more costly for emerging countries to service their dollar denominated debt at a time when their earnings from commodities are depressed by a simultaneous downturn in demand for their exports and a deterioration in the value of their currencies. There are also likely to be major issues when previously borrowed debt comes to maturity and requires refinancing at much more expensive rates.

Corporates (worldwide) heavily involved in mineral extraction and / or the commodities market may also be at risk and this could also cause volatility in equities and safe haven flows to bonds. Financial markets may also be buffeted by the sovereign wealth funds of those countries that are highly exposed to falls in commodity prices and which, therefore, may have to liquidate investments in order to cover national budget deficits.

### **Capita Asset Services Forward View**

Economic forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. Capita Asset Services undertook its last review of interest rate forecasts on 19 January 2016. Our Bank Rate forecasts, (and also MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data evolves over time. . There is much volatility in rates and bond yields as news ebbs and flows in negative or positive ways. This latest forecast includes a first increase in Bank Rate in quarter 4 of 2016.

The overall trend in the longer term will be for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise when economic recovery is firmly established accompanied by rising inflation and consequent increases in Bank Rate, and the eventual unwinding of QE. At some future point in time, an increase in investor confidence in eventual world economic recovery is also likely to compound this effect as recovery will encourage investors to switch from bonds to equities.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is currently to the downside, given the number of potential headwinds that could be growing on both the international and UK scene. Only time will tell just how long this current period of strong economic growth will last; it also remains exposed to vulnerabilities in a number of key areas.

However, the overall balance of risks to our Bank Rate forecast is probably to the downside, i.e. the first increase, and subsequent increases, may be delayed further if recovery in GDP growth, and forecasts for inflation increases, are lower than currently expected. Market expectations in January 2016, (based on short sterling), for the first Bank Rate increase are currently around quarter 1 2017.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- Emerging country economies, currencies and corporates destabilised by falling commodity prices and / or Fed. rate increases, causing a flight to safe havens.
- Geopolitical risks in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia, increasing safe haven flows.
- UK economic growth and increases in inflation are weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners - the EU and US.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
- Recapitalisation of European banks requiring more government financial support.
- Monetary policy action failing to stimulate sustainable growth and combat the threat of deflation in western economies, especially the Eurozone and Japan.

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- Uncertainty around the risk of a UK exit from the EU.
- The pace and timing of increases in the Fed. funds rate causing a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds as opposed to equities and leading to a major flight from bonds to equities.
- UK inflation returning to significantly higher levels than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

*Rhan o gyngor dderbyniwyd gan / An extract from advice received from: Capita Asset Services*

## Specified and Non-Specified Investments

The Welsh Government 'Guidance on Local Government Investments' (Effective from 1 April 2010) provides the definition of specified and non-specified investments.

Paragraph 5.1 of the 'Guidance' states that an investment is specified if all of the following apply:-

- (a) the investment is denominated in sterling and any payments or repayments in respect of the investment are payable only in sterling; and
- (b) the investment is not a long-term investment (\*); and
- (c) the making of the investment is not defined as capital expenditure by virtue of regulation 20(1)(d) of the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (Wales) Regulations 2003 [SI 3239 as amended]; and
- (ch) the investment is made with a body or in an investment scheme of high credit quality (\*\*); or with one of the following public-sector bodies:
  - (i) the United Kingdom Government
  - (ii) a local authority in England or Wales (as defined in section 23 of the 2003 Act) or a similar body in Scotland or Northern Ireland
  - (iii) a parish or community council.

The 'Guidance' also states that any investment not meeting the definition of paragraph 5.1 is classified as a non-specified investment.

During 2016/17 the Council does not intend to make any investments in foreign currencies, nor any with low credit quality bodies, nor any that are defined as capital expenditure by legislation (such as company shares). Non-specified investments will therefore be limited to (i) long-term investments; and (ii) deposits with the Council's own banker for transactional purposes if it fails to meet the basic credit criteria; in this instance balances will be minimised as far as is possible

The table in Appendix 6 set out the investment criteria and limits for the categories of investments intended for use during 2016/17 and therefore form the basis for the approved lending list.

Any proposed revisions or amendments during the year to the categories of specified and non-specified investments to be used and / or to the associated credit rating criteria / investment limits will be subject to prior approval by the County Council.

\* Section 2.4 of the 'Guidance' defines a long term investment as "any investment other than (a) one which is due to be repaid within 12 months of the date on which the investment was made or (b) one which the local authority may require to be repaid within that period."

\*\* For the purposes of high credit quality the 'Guidance' states that "for the purposes of paragraph 5.1(d), Welsh ministers recommend that the Strategy should define high credit quality (and where this definition refers to credit ratings, paragraph 6.1 (\*\*\*) is relevant)."

\*\*\* Paragraph 6.1 of the 'Guidance' recommends that "the Strategy should set out the authority's approach to assessing the risk of loss of investments, making clear in particular:

- (a) to what extent, if any, risk assessment is based upon credit ratings issued by one or more credit rating agencies;
- (b) where credit ratings are used, how frequently credit ratings are monitored and what action is to be taken when ratings change; and
- (c) what other sources of information on credit risk are used, additional to or instead of credit ratings."

The table in Appendix 6 of this strategy sets out what this Council defines as high credit quality and the associated investment criteria and limits and section 4.3 of this strategy sets out the Council's creditworthiness approach.

**Counterparty Criteria**

Category	Short Term Credit Rating (Fitch)	Short Term Credit Rating (Moody's)	Short Term Credit Rating (Standard & Poor's)	Long Term Credit Rating (Fitch)	Long Term Credit Rating (Moody's)	Long Term Credit Rating (Standard & Poor's)	Cash Limit	Time Limit
Banks and Building Societies (not nationalised or part nationalised)	F1+	P-1	A-1+	AAA	Aaa	AAA	£10m	5 years
	F1+	P-1	A-1+	AA	Aa2	AA	£10m	3 years
	F1+	P-1	A-1+	AA-	Aa3	AA-	£10m	364 days
	F1	P-1	A-1	A	A2	A	£7.5m	6 months
Nationalised / Part Nationalised UK Banks	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	£10m	364 days
UK Central Government (irrespective of credit rating)	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	No maximum	No maximum
UK Local Authorities**	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	£5m	364 days

\* as defined in the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (Wales) Regulations 2003

\*\* as defined in the Local Government Act 2003

**Notes and Clarifications****(1) Cash Limit**

- (i) The cash limits apply both to the individual counterparty and to the overall group to which it belongs (e.g. for the banks within the Lloyds Banking Group plc (being Bank of Scotland plc and Lloyds Bank plc), the investment limit applies to those banks individually and the banking group as a whole);
- (ii) The overall cash limit for deposits over 364 days is £15m.

**(2) Time Limit**

- (i) This up to and including the period indicated.

**(3) Foreign Countries**

- (i) Investments in foreign countries will be limited to those that hold a sovereign credit rating of (Fitch) AA- or equivalent (from the agencies referred to in section 4.4 of this strategy) sovereign credit rating (based upon the lowest common denominator), and to a maximum of £10 million per foreign country.
- (ii) Investments in countries whose lowest sovereign rating is not AA- or above will not be permitted. No country limit will apply to investments in the UK, irrespective of the sovereign credit rating.
- (iii) Subsidiaries of foreign banking groups will normally be assessed according to the country of domicile of the parent organisation. However, Santander UK plc (a subsidiary of Spain's Banco Santander) will be classed as a UK bank due to its substantial UK franchises and the arms-length nature of the parent-subsidary relationships.
- (iv) Sovereign credit rating criteria and foreign country limits will not apply to investments in multilateral development banks (e.g. the European Investment Bank and the World Bank) or other supranational organisations (e.g. the European Union).

**4. Credit Rating Downgrade**

Should a credit rating downgrade place a counterparty below the minimum credit rating criteria for investment, the counterparty will cease to be used as soon as practicable.

If the S151 Officer wishes to continue investing with that counterparty approval will be sought from the Chair of the Audit Committee plus one other member of the Chair's choosing, who both must approve the action. This will then be reported as appropriate at the next available opportunity.



**Approved countries for investments [correct as at 21 January 2016]**

*Based upon lowest available sovereign credit rating*

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Finland
- U.K.
- U.S.A.

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- Qatar

AA-

- Belgium

## Treasury management scheme of delegation

### (i) County Council

- budget approval;
- approval of the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement, Annual Investment Strategy and MRP Policy, annual Treasury Management Policy Statement and amendments thereto;
- approval of amendments to the Council's adopted clauses;
- receiving and reviewing monitoring reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities; and
- acting on recommendations received from the Audit Committee and/or Executive Committee.

### (ii) Executive Committee

- budget consideration;
- approval of the annual Treasury Management Practices and amendments thereto;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;
- approval of the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment;
- receiving and reviewing monitoring reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities and making recommendations to the County Council as appropriate;
- acting on recommendations received from the Audit Committee.

### (iii) Audit Committee

- Scrutiny of Treasury Management matters as required by CIPFA's Code of Practice on Treasury Management and the Council's Treasury Management Policy. This includes:-
  - scrutinising the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement, Annual Investment Strategy, Annual MRP Policy, Annual Treasury Management Policy and Treasury Management Practices and making recommendations to the Executive Committee and County Council as appropriate;
  - scrutinising proposals for amendments to the annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement, Annual Investment Strategy, Annual MRP Policy, Annual Treasury Management Policy and Treasury Management Practices and to the adopted clauses and making recommendations to the Executive and County Council as appropriate;
  - receiving and scrutinising any other proposals relating to the treasury management which require a decision by the Executive or County Council; and
  - receiving and scrutinising monitoring reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities and make recommendations to the Executive and County Council as appropriate.

## The treasury management role of the section 151 officer

### The S151 (responsible) officer's role includes:-

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit; and
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.
- Responsibility for the execution and administration of its Treasury decisions, including decision on borrowing, investment and financing, have been delegated to the Section 151 Officer, who will act in accordance with the Council's policy statements and TMP's.

## The CIPFA Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice

The key principles of CIPFA's *Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice (2011 Edition)*, as described in Section 4 of that Code are as follows:-

### Key Principle 1:

Public service organisations should put in place formal and comprehensive objectives, policies and practices, strategies and reporting arrangements for the effective management and control of their treasury management activities.

### Key Principle 2:

Their policies and practices should make clear that the effective management and control of risks are prime objectives of their treasury management activities and that responsibility for these lies clearly within their organisations. Their appetite for risk should form part of their annual strategy, including any use of financial instruments for the prudent management of those risks, and should ensure that priority is given to security and liquidity when investing funds.

### Key Principle 3:

They should acknowledge that the pursuit of value for money in treasury management and the use of suitable performance measures are valid and important tools for responsible organisations to employ in support of their business and service objectives; and that, within the context of effective risk management, their treasury management policies and practices should reflect this.

The Code then goes on to say that:

“In framing these recommendations, CIPFA acknowledges the difficulties of striving for effective risk management and control, whilst at the same time pursuing value for money. This code does not seek to be prescriptive about how this issue should be handled, particularly since it covers such a wide variety of organisations. However, where appropriate, the sector specific guidance notes give suitable advice. CIPFA recognises that no two organisations in the public services are likely to tackle this issue in precisely the same manner but success in this area of treasury management is likely to be viewed, especially in value for money terms, as an indicator of a strongly performing treasury management function.”

“Even though it dates back to 1991, CIPFA considers that the report by the Treasury and Civil Service Committee of the House of Commons on the BCCI closure is still pertinent, wherein it was stated that:”

*“In balancing risk against return, local authorities should be more concerned to avoid risks than to maximise returns.”*

“Indeed this view was supported by the Communities and Local Government Select Committee report into local authority investments in 2009.”

“It is CIPFA’s view that throughout the public services the priority is to protect capital rather than to maximise return. The avoidance of all risk is neither appropriate nor possible. However, a balance must be struck with a keen responsibility for public money.”

Accordingly the Authority will adopt, as part of the standing orders, the following four clauses;

1. The Authority will create and maintain, as the cornerstones for effective treasury management:
  - a treasury management policy statement, stating the policies, objectives and approach to risk management of its treasury management activities; and
  - suitable treasury management practices (TMPs) setting out the manner in which the Authority will seek to achieve those policies and objectives, and prescribing how it will manage and control those activities.

The content of the Policy Statement and TMPs will follow the recommendations contained in Sections 6 and 7 of the Code, subject only to amendment where necessary to reflect the particular circumstances of the Authority. Such amendments will not result in the Authority materially deviating from the Code's key principles.

2. The County Council, Executive Committee and the Audit Committee will receive reports on the Authority's treasury management policies, practices and activities, including; an annual strategy and plan in advance of the year, a mid-year review report and an annual report after its close, in the form prescribed in the TMPs. .
3. The County Council/Executive Committee are responsible for the implementation of the Authority's treasury management policies and practices in accordance with the Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation. The S151 Officer is responsible for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions, who will act in accordance with the Authority's policy statement and TMPs and, if he/she is a CIPFA member, CIPFA's Standard of Professional Practice on Treasury Management.
4. The Authority nominates Audit Committee to be responsible for ensuring effective scrutiny of treasury management strategy and policies.

**Treasury Management Policy Statement**

1. The Authority defines its treasury management activities as: “The management of the authority’s investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks”.
2. This organisation regards the successful identification, monitoring and control of risk to be the prime criteria by which the effectiveness of its treasury management activities will be measured. Accordingly, the analysis and reporting of treasury management activities will focus on their risk implications for the organisation, and any financial instruments entered into to manage these risks.
3. This organisation acknowledges that effective treasury management will provide support towards the achievement of its business and service objectives. It is therefore committed to the principles of achieving value for money in treasury management, and to employing suitable comprehensive performance measurement techniques, within the context of effective risk management.

**PRUDENTIAL & TREASURY INDICATORS  
BUDGET SETTING 2016/17**

**Appendix 11**

**No. Indicator**

<b>Affordability</b>		<b>2014/15 out-turn</b>	<b>2015/16 estimate</b>	<b>2016/17 proposal</b>	<b>2017/18 proposal</b>	<b>2018/19 proposal</b>
<b>1,2</b>	Estimates of [or actual] ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream:					
	Council Fund	5.95%	6.38%	7.00%	7.60%	7.76%
	Housing Revenue Account (inclusive of settlement)	15.00%	23.31%	21.87%	20.14%	18.21%
	Total	6.85%	8.14%	8.61%	9.05%	9.05%
<b>3</b>	Estimates of incremental impact of capital investment decisions on the Council Tax			£7.53	£46.48	£51.98
	<i>for the Band D Council Tax</i>					
<b>4</b>	Estimates of incremental impact of capital investment decisions on housing rents			£16.66	£16.19	£15.46
	<i>on average weekly rent levels</i>					
<b>Prudence</b>						
<b>5</b>	Gross debt and the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	<i>Is the gross external debt &lt; the CFR for the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for the current and the next two financial years?</i>					
<b>Capital Expenditure</b>		<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>
<b>6,7</b>	Estimates of [or actual] capital expenditure					
	Council Fund	15,768	18,210	33,900	17,820	23,980
	Housing Revenue Account	5,519	6,960	14,900	7,670	6,400
	Total	21,287	25,170	48,800	25,490	30,380
<b>8,9</b>	Estimates of [or actual] Capital Financing Requirement					
	Council Fund	85,926	86,781	95,748	97,456	97,825
	Housing Revenue Account	22,650	43,397	43,529	42,658	41,805
	Total	108,576	130,178	139,277	140,114	139,630
<b>External Debt</b>		<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>
<b>10</b>	Authorised Limit					
	: General Borrowing	125,000	121,800	144,800	145,800	144,800
	: HRA Settlement	0	21,200	21,200	21,200	21,200
	: Other long term liabilities	2,000	2,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
	: Total	127,000	145,000	169,000	170,000	169,000

<b>11</b>	HRA Limit on Indebtedness;					
	HRA Limit on Indebtedness	n/a	n/a	58,553	58,553	58,553
	HRA CFR	n/a	n/a	43,529	42,658	41,805
	HRA headroom	n/a	n/a	15,024	15,895	16,748
<b>12</b>	Operational Boundary					
	: General Borrowing	120,000	116,800	139,800	140,800	139,800
	: HRA Settlement	0	21,200	21,200	21,200	21,200
	: Other long term liabilities	2,000	2,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
	: Total	122,000	140,000	164,000	165,000	164,000
<b>13</b>	Actual External Debt	89,583				
<b>Treasury Management</b>		<b>2014/15 out-turn</b>	<b>2015/16 estimate</b>	<b>2016/17 proposal</b>	<b>2017/18 proposal</b>	<b>2018/19 proposal</b>
<b>14</b>	The Local Authority has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the Public Services	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
		<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>	<b>£000</b>
<b>15</b>	Gross and net debt	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	<i>The upper limit on the net debt as a proportion of gross debt</i>					
<b>16</b>	The upper limit on fixed rate exposures: ( net principal outstanding)	125,000	143,000	166,000	167,000	166,000
<b>17</b>	The upper limit on variable rate exposures: ( net principal outstanding)	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000
<b>18</b>	The limit for total principal sums invested for periods longer than 364 days (any long term investments carried forward from previous years will be included in each year's limit)	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
			<b>2015/16 upper limit</b>	<b>2015/16 lower limit</b>		
<b>19</b>	The upper and lower limits for the maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing					
	• under 12 months		20%		0%	
	• 12 months and within 24 months		20%		0%	
	• 24 months and within 5 years		50%		0%	
	• 5 years and within 10 years		75%		0%	
	• 10 years and above		100%		0%	
			no change		no change	

## Glossary of and information on Prudential & Treasury Management indicators (References as per appendix 11)

### Prudential Indicators

#### A) Affordability

##### 1,2 Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.

The estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals in this budget report.

##### 3. Incremental impact of capital investment decisions on council tax

This indicator identifies the revenue costs associated with proposed changes to the three year capital programme recommended in this budget report compared to the Council's existing approved commitments and current plans. The assumptions are based on the budget, but will invariably include some estimates, such as the level of Government support, which are not published over a three year period.

##### 4. Estimates of the incremental impact of capital investment decisions on housing rent levels

Similar to the council tax calculation, this indicator identifies the trend in the cost of proposed changes in the housing capital programme recommended in this budget report compared to the Council's existing commitments and current plans, expressed as a discrete impact on weekly rent levels.

This indicator shows the revenue impact on any newly proposed changes, although any discrete impact will be constrained by rent controls.

#### B) Prudence

##### 5. Gross Debt and the CFR

The Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2016/17 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue purposes.



## C) Capital expenditure

### 6,7. Estimates of Capital Expenditure

This is the forecast Capital Expenditure from 2015/16 to 2018/19, and is based on the Capital Bids received for 2016/17.

### 8,9 The Council's borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement)

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the borrowing need in line with each assets life.

The CFR includes any other long term liabilities (e.g. PFI schemes, finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. The Council currently has £nil of such schemes within the CFR.

The HRA indicators (reference 9) reflect the HRA self-financing settlement of £21.2m.

## CH) External Debt

- 10. The authorised limit for external debt.** A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Council. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all councils' plans, or those of a specific council, although this power has not yet been exercised.

The S151 Officer reports that the Council complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in the budget report.

- 11. HRA Limit on Indebtedness.** As part of the HRA self-financing reform each Welsh local authority with responsibility for housing will be allocated a limit on indebtedness in relation to the HRA; this essentially places a limit on the HRA CFR (to be applied at 31st March each year). The gap between the two, if the CFR is within the limit, will be referred to as the borrowing headroom. The forecast account for the HRA settlement on the same basis as for the ratio in reference 2.
- 12. The operational boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt.

This indicator reflects the potential HRA self-financing settlement value on the same basis as for the Authorised Limit indicator.

## **Treasury Management Indicators**

### **Treasury management limits on activity**

There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these are to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:-

- Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure. This identifies a maximum limit for variable interest rates based upon the debt position net of investments;
- Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure. This is similar to the previous indicator and covers a maximum limit on fixed interest rates; and
- Maturity structure of borrowing. These gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing, and are required for upper and lower limits.